Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 2
Issue 2 1993-1994

Article 6

1994

Case Summaries

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Case Summaries, 2 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 107 (1994)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol2/iss2/6

This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri
School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and
Sustainability Law by an authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

CASE SUMMARIES
CERCLA
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton
Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321 (7th Cir.

1994)
Lefton Iron purchased a 40 acre industrial site from Kerr-McGee's predecessor in
interest, Moss-American, in 1972. Lefton
Iron transferred ownership to Lefton Land in
1984. Moss-American and other prior owners used the site from 1927 to 1969 to
manufacture wood products with processes
that used creosote and other preservatives.
Significant quantities of preservatives were
left at the site after Moss-American stopped
operations. In 1988, the State of Illinois filed
suit against Kerr-McGee, Lefton Iron, and
Lefton Land in order to enforce cleanup of
the site. Kerr-McGee entered into a consent
decree with the state which required it to
undertake the remediation at its expense.
Kerr-McGee subsequently incurred $1.5
million in remediation expenses in a cleanup
estimated to cost $5 million.
Kerr-McGee then filed a CERCLA suit
against Lefton Iron and Lefton Land (collectively Lefton) which contained three claims.
The first soughtadeclaration that Lefton was
liable under § 107(a) of CERCLA and that
Kerr-McGee's response costs were necessary and consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP). Second, Kerr-McGee
sought contribution from Lefton for its response costs under § 113(f(1) of CERCLA.
Third, Kerr-McGee claimed that Lefton was
liable for all cleanup costs based on an
indemnification clause in the 1972 contract.
The district court ruled against Kerr-McGee
on all counts. Kerr-McGee appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on the first count, stating
simply that Kerr-McGee had established the
elements of CERCLA liability and that Lefton
was unable to establish a statutory defense.
The only contested element was whether
Lefton was a "responsible person" under
§ 107(a). The court found that Lefton Land

was responsible as the current owner, while
Lefton Iron was responsible as a prior owner
of the site at the time of an actual or a
threatened release. The court found Lefton
Land's attempt to make out an "innocent
landowner"defenseunderCERCLA§107(b)
without merit. The Seventh Circuit ordered
the district court to enter judgment for KerrMcGee on count one, and further ordered it
to make a determination as to whether KerrMcGee's response costs were consistent
with the NCP, and whether future response
costs were appropriate.
The Seventh Circuit turned next to the
issue of contribution. The court ruled that
the district court erred in not considering the
indemnity agreement in the equitable balancing it applied to the cleanup costs. The
Court of Appeals noted that Lefton had
knowledge of the preservatives on the site
when it purchased the property, and that
Lefton bought the site "as is" and agreed to
assume all future liabilities stemming from
the chemical pollutants. The court felt that
thiswasasignificantcircumstancethatshould
have been considered, however it stated that
a reallocation of contribution would probably be unnecessary on remand given its
ruling on Kerr-McGee's third count.
The Seventh Circuit overruled the district court's holding on the third count of
Kerr-McGee's petition. The district court
held that the indemnity provision of the
1972 contract between Moss-American and
Lefton was unclear and refused to enforce it
The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding the
provision sufficiently clear. The court noted
that the provision covered all pollution and
nuisance claims, and that the response costs
incurredbyKerr-McGeeweredefinitelywithin
its scope. The court found that Lefton was
responsible for Kerr-McGee's $1.5 million in
already-incurred cleanup costs, as well as
any future cleanup expenditures. The Seventh Circuit chided the district court for
considering the irrelevant fact that the parties entered into the contract prior to
CERCLA's enactment. Furthermore, it
pointed out that Illinois' Environmental Pro-

I---

tection Act was law two years prior to the
contract. The Seventh Circuit-interpreted
the indemnity clause as an agreement by
Lefton to assume the future costs resulting
from the chemicals at the site. The court
pointed out that while Lefton probably paid
a reduced price for the property, a poor
bargain in hindsight was not a reason to
invalidate the indemnity agreement. The
Seventh Circuit remanded this count to the
district court and ordered it to provide KerrMcGee with indemnification for all proven
present and future cleanup costs and expenses.
- by Theodore A. Kardis

GNB, Inc. v. Gould, Inc., No. 90 C
2413, 1994 WL 110210 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 25,
1994)
In 1982, Gould, Inc. (Gould), a large
publicly held conglomerate, set out to divest
itself of its division in the battery business.
Gould created a wholly-owned subsidiary,
GNB Batteries, Inc. (GNB Batteries), to facilitate a sale. Gould transferred all of the assets
and liabilities of its battery division to GNB
Batteries. In 1983 Gould put GNB Batteries
up for sale. The buying group, formed as
GNB Acquisition Corp (GNB Acquisition),
consisted of three Gould executives in its
battery business together with Allen and
Company, Inc. and one of its principals.
Upon thesale, GNB Acquisitionwas merged
into GNB Batteries and the name of the new
company was changed to GNB, Inc. (GNB).
The main issue in this suit was to what
extent the new company, GNB, acquired the
liabilities of Gould under the assumption
agreement between Gould and GNB Batteries. This issue mainly arose upon discovery
of serious environmentalproblemsthatarose
several years later at certain Gould facilities
now defunct, some old Gould facilities still in
operation under the GNB name, and other
facilities at various common storage or waste
sites never owned by Gould or used by GNB.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigated the potential
liability of these sites pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) and Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
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(CERCLA). Although CERCLA mandates
that each person responsible for the environmental problems is strictly liable, a party may
enter into an agreement to indemnify another party for CERCLA liability ifthe language of their agreement indicates this intent.
Gould argued that the 1983 assumption agreement made between it and GNB
Batteries expressly transferred all of its absolute, accrued, and contingent liabilities to
GNB Batteries. GNB conceded that it alone
bore the responsibility for cleanup at the sites
acquired from Gould that GNB itself was still
operating. However, GNB claimed that it
had not agreed to indemnify Gould for the
cleanup at closed Gould plants or common
dump sites used only prior to the sale.
The court began its discussion by noting thatthe primary goal of contract interpretation "is to give effect to the reasonable
expectation of the parties." Illinois law
requires that where the contract isclear on its
face, the court must not resort to the rules of
construction, but rather should give the contract its plain meaning effect. The intent of
the parties becomes important only when
the-terms of .the agreement are reasonably
susceptible of more than one meaning. The
determination of whether or not the contract
is embiguous can be made with reference to
parol and extrinsic evidence.
. The assumption agreement between
Gould and GNBBatteries purported to transfer all of Gould's obligations and liabilities "of
any nature relating to the businesses and
operations of its battery division that had
been incurred prior to its sale to GNB Acquisition," but failed to discuss environmental
problems caused by former Gould manufacturing and operations. The court stated that
both Gould and GNB Acquisition-personnel,
because of their previous association- with
Gould, knew of all of the potential environmental liability. Thus, the parties had at least
implicitly considered this factor.
* The court applied the facts to the contract and held that the affected sites constituted liabilities and obligations of. Gould,
contingent on the date of dosing such that
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they were potential liabilities to GNB, which
related to Gould's business and operations.
The court also held impermissible GNB's
construction of the term "incurred" to mean
fixed liabilities prior to closing date. GNB's
proposed construction would render much
of the language of the assumption agreement meaningless, specifically the provision
in which GNB Batteries assumes Gould's
contingent liabilities.
The court commented that other portions of the assumption agreement substantiated its conclusion that all of Gould's environmental liabilities were assumed by GNB
Batteries. First, because GNB Acquisition
bargained for Gould to retain certain liabilities, including existing litigation and all product liability claims in which the injury predated dosing, GNB could not now successfully argue that it did not assume other
liabilities. Further, the language of the assumption agreement makes clear that Gould
intended to rid itself of its battery business
entirely because it retained very little liability
and that only after hard bargaining. Thus,
GNB's liability was not limited to that attached to the specific assets it had acquired.
Instead, GNB's liability included all liability
not expressly excluded by agreement which
related "to the businesses and operations" of
Gould's battery divisions. The court would
not read any implied terms into the contract.
The court held that the language of the
assumption agreement was unambiguous
and thatiteffectivelytransferredallof Gould's
environmental liabilities connected to its battery divisions to GNB Batteries and its successor GNB.
The court stated that even ifthe language of the agreement were ambiguous,
the parol evidence indicated that the parties
intended to transfer all of Gould's environmental liability. Important in this determination was Gould's expressed intent that it
wanted to divest itself of the good and bad
aspects of the battery business, a memorandum to GNB Acquisition and other potential
buyers detailing this intent the intimate familiarity of principals in GNB Acquisition
with Gould's operations, including its dis-
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posal of toxic waste, and an opinion letter by
GNB Acquisition's attorney stating that GNB
acquisitions was acquiring all known and
unknown environmental liabilities.
- by Thad Mulholland

Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Browner,
848 F.Supp. 1369 (N.D.ll. 1994)
Fire destroyed a building owned by an
Employers Insurance of Wausau (Wausau)
policyholder. Wausau settled with the policyholder and agreed to remove debris from
thedestroyedbuilding, including several electrical transformers. Wausau drained seven
hundred gallons of fluid from the transformers and transported it to an oil recycling
facility. The recycling facility was subsequently found to be contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) that originated
in the transformer fluids.
The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) named Wausau as a potentially responsible party and demanded cleanup assistance under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) as amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). When Wausau did
not respond the EPA issued an administrative order to compel Wausau to begin emergency cleanup measures. Wausau objected,
denying that it was a potentially responsible
party. The EPA filed an administrative
action pursuant to the Toxic Substance ControlAct(TSCA)toforcecompliance. Wausau
then submitted an Emergency Response
Action Plan (ERAP), subsequently approved
by the EPA, which stated how Wausau would
comply with the administrative order but did
notadmitanyliability. Wausau began cleanup
but refused to remove any substance not
covered by the order or the ERAP. The EPA
maintained that both the order and the
ERAP were broadlyworded and that cleanup
was not limited to just PCB contamination.
The District Court stated that when
such an environmental hazard is discovered,
CERCLA gives the EPA authority to either
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take direct cleanup action and seek reimbursement later or to require the responsible
parties to conduct the cleanup themselves. If
the EPA has to issue an administrative order
to compel cleanup assistance, as it did in this
case, the court said the potentially responsible party (PRP) has one of two choices. It
can ignore the order and wait for the EPA to
bring an enforcement action, whereupon the
PRP has a right to a judicial hearing. Under
this alternative, the PRP may be subject to
fines for failure to comply with the administrative order absent sufficient cause. Alternatively, the PRP may comply with the
cleanup order and petition the EPA for
reimbursement later.
Wausau claimed that CERCLA violates
the constitutional right to procedural due
process, both in the pre-enforcement and
post-enforcement stages. The court denied
this claim and stated that even ifWausau did
not have an opportunity to a meaningful
hearing before it began its forced cleanup, no
hearing was required under. Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which
weighed the interests of the private party, the
government, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private party's interest and the
value of additional procedural safeguards in
determining whether a "meaningful hearing" was provided. Under the Matthews
balancing test, Wausau failed to prove that its
economic interests outweighed the EPA's
interests in enforcing its orders, or that
additional procedural safeguards would provide any additional protection to Wausau's
constitutional rights. The court held that
Wausau's procedural due process rights remained intact because Wausau had proper
notice of the order and what it required, and
then failed to exercise its option to request a
judicial hearing.
The court also denied Wausau's claim
that the EPA violated its substantive due
process rights. The court followed the Seventh Circuit test which requires the plaintiff
to show that the lower court's decision was
arbitrary and irrational, and a separate constitutional violation or inadequacy of state
law remedies. Since the court rejected

Wausau's procedural due process argument,
it could not prevail on its substantive due
process claim even ifthe lower court's decision was arbitrary and irrational.
The court denied Wausau's equal protection claim because it failed to allege that it
was a member of a cognizable group accorded different treatment because of its
membership in that group. Wausau attempted to define its class as "potentially
liable parties which are financially able to
incur response costs." Even if Wausau
alleged disparate treatment based on this
membership, dicta in the opinion suggests
the court would probably not have accepted
Wausau's definition of the class.
Wausau also claimed that it was denied
a review under the Administrative Procedure
Act. The court stated that the APA is not
applicable when a relevant statute precludes
judicial review, as CERCLA did in this case.
In conclusion, the court granted the defendants' motion forjudgment on the pleadings.
- by Don WilIoh

Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846
F.Supp. 1382 (W.D.Mo. 1994)
Residents of Silver Creek and Saginaw
Village filed a class action lawsuit against
FAG Bearings alleging that it had released
the chemical TCE into the groundwater,
which in turn contaminated their well water.
FAG Bearings brought in a number of other
corporationsinthesurroundingareaasthirdparty defendants. The third-party defendants moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that FAG Bearings could not show
a causal link between them and the contamination alleged by the residents of the two
towns.
FAG Bearings' suit against the thirdpartydefendantswasbroughtunderCERCLA
§ 113, seeking indemnity or contribution
towards its liability to the town residents, and
§ 107, alleging that the third-party defendants contaminated the FAG Bearings site.
The U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Missouri consolidated its discussion of these claims, explaining that the
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elements for eachwerethesame. The thirdparty defendants argued that FAG Bearings
was unable to prove a "release" of a hazardous substance at their sites, and furthermore
that FAG Bearings could not demonstrate
that such a release caused the Silver Creek/
Saginaw Village contamination.
The court first addressed the role of
causation under § 107. It noted that the
element of causation had received little attention by the courts to date since the "release"
at issue in most lawsuits was at the contaminated site instead of elsewhere. The court
distinguished the instant case, calling it a
"two-site" case - one in which the release
occurred at a site other than the contaminated site. It refused to apply the strict
liability provisions of CERCLA to this "twosite" scenario, stating that to do so would
bring about an absurd result. The court then
looked to two cases that had dealt with
multiple-site causation: Dedham Water Co.
v. Cumberland Farms (Dedham I, 689
F.Supp. 1223 (D.Mass. 1988); Dedham II,
889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1989); DedhamIII,
770 F.Supp. 41 (D.Mass. 1991); Dedham
IV, 972 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1992)) and
Artesian Water Co. u. New Castle, 659

F.Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851
F.2d 643 (3rdCir. 1988). TheDistrictCourt
distilled a framework for analyzing causation
under CERCIA from these two cases. It
identified two potential scenarios and the
test for each. Inthe first scenario, where the
plaintiff can prove that the release by the
defendant, but not the actual contamination,
caused it to incur response costs, "fingerprinting" to prove the actual contamination
caused by that defendant is unnecessary. In
the other scenario, where the plaintiff incurs
response costs solely due to the actual contamination, it must prove that a release by
the defendant actually caused the contamination at its site. The court determined that
the case before it fell into the latter category.
The court then turned to the sufficiency
of FAG Bearings' evidence on the issue of
whether the third-party defendants had released TCE that caused contamination at the
FAGsite. Thecourt noted thatthetestimony
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of FAG's expert was the sole evidence presented by FAG on the causation issue. After
a thorough analysis of the testimony, the
court concluded that the expert's opinions
were unsupported by any factual basis and
that his testimony was inadmissible since it
did not establish a causal link between any
third-party defendant and the contamination. The court determined that FAG Bearings was without sufficient evidence on the
issue of causation, and the third-party defendants' motion for summary judgment was
granted independently on this basis. However, the court went on to address the
"release" issue as well.
There were numerous third-party defendants, and the court addressed the releaseissueas to each oneof them. Forsome,
the court found that there was absolutely no
evidence of a release, and that these defendants were entitled to summary judgment on
this additional basis. For others, the court
stated that while enough evidence may exist
to raise a question of material fact, summary
judgment was still warranted on the causation issue. Thus, the motion for summary
judgment was granted as to all third-party
defendants, -and FAG Bearings' third-party
complaint was dismissed without prejudice.
Finally, the court also denied FAG Bearings'
request for additional discovery, but it did
allow FAG to inspect the- property of the
third-party defendants pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 34 and 45.
-

by Theodore A. Kardis

Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846

F.Supp. 1400 (W.D.Mo. 1994)
This decision of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri is another in the ongoing toxic tort
litigation between the .residents of Silver
Creek and Saginaw Village and the FAG
Bearings Corporation The court considered plaintiffs' amended motion for class
certification and FAG Bearings' motion for
partial summaryjudgmenton plaintiffs' claims
of mental anguish, fear of cancer, increased
risk of cancer, and medical monitoring.
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Thecourt first addressed the motion for
class certification. Plaintiffs claimed that
theyhadsatisfiedFed.R.Civ.P. 23(bX2)which
provides for a class action, most notably
where injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate, but in no case where the relief
sought relates primarily to money damages.
The court denied plaintiffs' attempt to utilize
their CERCLA response costs as a springboard to class certification, stating that regardless of the equitable nature of these
response costs, the relief sought by plaintiffs
was primarily monetary. Furthermore, the
court noted that the claims of plaintiffs' class
representative would not be representative
of other class members, since many plaintiffs
incurred no response costs. The court also
denied plaintiffs' attempt to use their request
for injunctive relief under RCRA as a justification for class certification on the same
grounds. The plaintiffs also maintained that
a class action was appropriate because of
their claim for future medical monitoring, but
the court denied certification on this basis as
well, explaining that the claim was merely
another element of tort damages, not a claim
for injunctive relief.
The court concluded its denial of the
motion for class certification by noting that
the multiplicity of individual causation and
damage issues made a class action unjustified. -The court predicted that a class pction
would have more detriments than benefits in
the case before it inlight of the thousands of
mini-trials that class certification would necessitate.
The court turned next to an extensive
discussion of FAG Bearings' motion for
partial summary judgment on several of
plaintiffs' tort law claims. In all cases, the
court found that plaintiffs' lack of presently
apparent physical injuries barred their recovery at the present time. However, the court
made it clear that while plaintiffs were presently foreclosed from recovering under Missouri law on the four theories they presented, they were not precluded from future
recovery if they developed physical injuries
resulting from TCE contamination. Thus,
the court granted the motion for partial
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summary judgment and dismissed the four
claims without prejudice.
- by Theodore A. Kardis

MISSOURI STATE COURTS
Missouri Hosp. Ass'n v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d 380 (Mo.

Ct. App. 1994)
The Air Conservation Commission of
Missouri (Commission)was created by Chapter 643 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.
The Commission has rulemaking authority
and receives technical support from the
Missouri Department of Natural Resources
(DNR). The Commission promulgated Rule
160, which regulates medical waste and
solid waste incinerators, and Rule 190, regulating sewage sludge and industrial waste
incinerators. The Missouri Hospital Association and Associated Industries of Missouri
(collectively, the Associations) filed a petition
in the Circuit Court of Cole County challenging the validity of these rules which sought
declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.
Thereafter, the Associations filed a motion
forsummary judgment on these counts which
was granted by the Circuit Court on two
separate grounds. The Commission and
DNR (collectively, the State) appealed to the
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
The Western District first addressed the
circuit court's ruling on the grounds that the
State failed to comply with Mo. REv. STAT.
§§ 536.200 and 536.205 when it promulgated and adopted the rules, thus making
them void. Section 536.200 requires that a
"fiscal note" for public funds expenditures be
filed with the Secretary of State when the
notice of proposed rulemaking is filed. The
statute further provides that failure to do this
renders the rule void. Section 536.205 has
analogous requirements for a fiscal note
concerning the expenditure of funds by private persons or entities. The Court of
Appeals noted that while a fiscal note had
been filed when Rule 160 was originally
promulgated, the rule had been withdrawn.
Since a new fiscal note had not been filed
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when the new Rule 160 was promulgated,
the court ruled that this constituted a violation of § 536.200. Furthermore, the "private entity cost" estimates filed by the Commission with both versions of Rule 160 were
found by the court to be inadequate to
constitute a fiscal note within the meaning of
§ 536.205. Thus, the court found that Rule
160 was void for failure to meet either of
these statutory requirements.
The Western District next looked to
Rule 190, and found that the Commission
had failed to comply with either § 536.200
or § 536.205 in that it had not made a
comprehensive attempt to consider the effect of the rule in terms of compliance costs
incurred by the various state agencies, political subdivisions, and private entities affected
by the rule. Thus, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the circuit court's holding that the
two rules were void under both statutory
provisions.
At the state's behest, the Court considered the other issue presented: whether the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the grounds that Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 643.055 limits the Commission's
rulemaking authority and that the Commission was thus without authority to promulgate Rule 160 and 190. The State claimed
that the Commission had authority to promulgate the rules under § 643.050, however
the Court ruled that the more specific and
more recent § 643.055 placed a limitation
on the general rulemaking authority granted
by § 643.050. The Court stated that §
643.055.1 provides that Missouri can make
no rule stricter than required by federal law,
and that it shall not enforce any rule earlier
than the date required by federal law. Thus,
the Court explained, the Missouri legislature
chose to allow the federal Clean Air Act to
preempt the Commission's rulemaking authority. Since the U.S. Congress instructed
the EPA to promulgate rules concerning
incinerators and had set compliance dates,
the Court concluded that any Missouri rule
concerning incinerators adopted prior to the
promulgation of the EPA rules would necessarily be stricter than federal law and prior to

federal compliance dates, a dual violation of

§ 643.055. Thus, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the circuit court's order granting
summary judgment on the separate ground
that the Commission had exceeded its
rulemaking authority in promulgating Rules
160 and 190.
- by Theodore A. Kardis

Greene County Concerned Citizens
v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of

Greene County, 873 S.W.2d 246 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994)
Plaintiffs, a Missouri not-for-profit corporation, brought an action in circuit court
for judicial review of a zoning decision pursuant to Mo. REv. STAT.

§ 64.281.4. The

plaintiffs contested an order issued by the
Board of Zoning Adjustment of Greene
County (Board) that allowed the City of
Springfield to construct a materials recovery
facility (MRF) in an area zoned "A-1 Agriculture District". The Board's conclusions of
law indicated that the proposed MRF site
was a conditional use permitted in an "A-1
Agriculture Zone" by Article V, §3(K) of the
Greene County Zoning Regulations (Regulations). Article V, § 3 of the Regulations
permitted sixteen different non-agricultural
or commercial uses which could be made of
land zoned "A-1 Agriculture" upon Board
review and approval. One of these conditional uses included the "[djisposal of garbage or refuse by the County, a ... municipal-

ity, or agent thereof, subject to the provision
of the Missouri State Statutes." The circuit
court affirmed the Board's order stating that
competent and substantial evidence supported the Board's finding of fact, conclusions of law, and order. In making its ruling,
the court excluded substantive evidence
offered by the Plaintiffs regarding the hazards of the proposed MRF which was not
previously presented to the Board. The
Plaintiffs appealed.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Southem District held that the circuit court
properly excluded the new substantive evidenceofferedbytheplaintiff. Whenacounty

court reviews a zoning decision made pursuant to the discretionary power of a zoning
board, it can only hear additional evidence if
offered for the purpose of showing what
evidence was before the circuit court or ifit
concerned the legality of the hearing. Here,
the Board clearly exercised discretion by
imposing several conditions on the project
and the new evidence offered by the Plaintiffs
fit into neither permissible category. If the
result reached by the Board was one that
could have reasonably been reached, the
court could overtum it only if it was clearly
contrary to the overwhelming weight of
evidence. Accordingly the court set out to
determine the reasonableness of the decision.
Because the Regulations did not define
"disposal," the court was left to determine
the meaning of that term. The Plaintiffs
argued that the MRF was a "complex, industrial operation" and not asitefor the disposal
of garbage and refuse and that industrial uses
arenotpermittedin"A-1 AgricultureZones".
In addition, the Plaintiffs claimed that because waste was brought in and processed
with the intention of shipping it elsewhere,
the MRF could not be a "disposal" facility
under the Regulations. The court held that
since the Regulations leave the term "disposal" undefined, it should be given its plain,
ordinary, and natural meaning. Material
brought to the MRF would be sorted as
recyclable or non-recyclable, with the latter
being shipped to landfills and the former
either being composted on site or shipped to
recycling centers. The court reasoned that
these steps were "constituent parts" of the
waste disposal process and thus consistent
with the ordinary meaning of disposal.
The court held that great weight should
be given to the construction of a zoning
regulation by the entity charged with its
enactment and application. The court also
noted that where terms in zoning regulations
are susceptible to different interpretations,
the interpretation that least restricts the right
of land owners to use their land should be
given weight. On these facts and laws, the
court held that competent and substantial
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evidence supported the Board's decision to
issue the order. Accordingly, the court could
not hear any new evidence offered by the
Plaintiffs, no matter how substantial. The
decision was not arbitrary and capricious and
the order withstands judicial scrutiny.
The Plaintiffs also argued thatthe Board
erred when it refused to consider new evidence proffered by the Plaintiffs after an
earlier Board order, which granted the conditional use permit, was overturned by the
circuit court because the Board failed to
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The circuit court remanded the case back to
the Board. When the Board reconvened, It
adopted its finding of facts and conclusions
of law based on the record of the earlier
meeting and did not hear the additional
evidence. The court held that Board's refusal to reopen the record was permissible in
light of the expansive evidence offered at the
prior meeting and because the Board members, in re-issuing the order, relied on the
evidence presented at the earlier hearings.
- by Thad Mulholland

State ofMissouri v. Sefer, 871 S.W.2d

611 (Mo. Ct App. 1994)
DefendantJones Chemicals, Inc. (Jones)
filed a petition for a Writ of Prohibition
stemming from a denial of its motion for
summary judgement on a failure to warn
case againstJones (Clifton u. Clifton Farms
and Jones Chem. Co., Inc.). The underly-

ing cause of action againstJones arose out of
Eugene Clifton's (Clifton) use of a brand of
hydrochloric acid manufactured by Jones.
Clifton used the acid to unclog pipes located
at the bottom of a water well, and was fatally
overcome by the acid fumes. Plaintiff, on
behalf of Clifton, first alleged that Jones
failed to properly warn Clifton of the acid's
dangerous propensities when used in a well.
Plaintiff further alleged that Jones did not
adequately warn Clifton of the danger associated with using the acid in a well.
Jones' motion for summaryjudgement
claimed that the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) preempts Plaintiffs com-
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mon lawfailuretowarclaim, andthatJones
fully complied with the labeling requirements
set forth intheFHSA. The circuit court judge
denied Jones' motion.
The appellate court first examined the
Congressional intent behind the enactment
of the FHSA and stated that the basis for
determining whether the state common law
is preempted can be found in the purpose
behind the FHSA. This purpose is to alleviate the impracticability of allowing every
statetoimposeitsownlabelingrequirements
by only pennitting state labeling requirements which are identical to those implemented by the FHSA. Although both sides
agreed that the FHSA preempts state legislative regulation pertaining to warning labels
on hazardous substances, the question remained as to whether the FHSA preempted
state common law tort action based on
failure to wam as well.
The court held that the FHSA did
preempt state common law tort claims which
are founded upon the adequacy of hazardous substance labeling, but only to the extent
that such claims would result in state labeling
requirements which are different from those
imposed by the FHSA. In reaching this
conclusion, the court looked to FHSA's
preemption provision which provides that
states may not establish any cautionary labeling requirement unless they are identical to
those requirements under the FHSA. The
court determined that this provision encompassed not only positive enactments by a
state but also state common law. Therefore,
the court found that the Writ of Prohibition
was the proper remedy in this case.
- by V. Alyse Hakami

Cantrell v. Farm Bureau Town and
Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 876 S.W.2d

660 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
On December 17, 1989, a fire burned
down a portion of the home of the Cantrell
family. The fire bumed a room containing a
pool filter and a heat pump for the family's
indoor pool. Within the room was thirty
pounds of chlorine tablets, two gallons of
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muriatic acid, and a certain type of PVC
piping and polyurethane foam. These chemicals burned, which released toxic smoke and
assorted fumes throughout the house along
with freon gas from the air conditioning unit.
Farm Bureau Insurance Company insured
the family home with an "all risk, type three"
policy. The Cantrells submitted a claim for
total loss, the value of which being $458,000.
Farm Bureau rejected the claim and the
lawsuit resulted.
The applicable language of the policy
stated: "We cover direct loss not otherwise
excluded in this policy that follows caused by
fire, smoke (but not smoke from agricultural
smudging or industrial operations) . . ." A

section in the policy excluded coverage for,
among other things, "wear and tear, . . contamination, . . . bulging or expansion of
pavement, floors, etc. . .". The Cantrell's

offered evidence that the house was uninhabitable. For several days after the fire, the
family members suffered headaches, nausea, burning eyes, stomach cramps, and
diarrhea. The phenomena subsided only
when the family left the house for extended
periods. The trees and plants within the
home died, the pet cats vomited, the family
found dead mice, and a "black, sooty, oily
substance" appeared on the surface of the
walls, refrigerator and counters.
The parties conducted tests on dust
particles from within the home. A chemical
engineer and certified industrial hygienist
testified that the tests disclosed toluene, xylene, ethyl methyl benzene, dioxins, and
chloride. Several experts testified that the
fire caused the presence of these and other
unidentifiable chemicals, and that all were
detrimental to human health. The experts
estimated a fifty to one hundred year period
before the chemicals to dissipate, and as the
house was uninhabitable it needed to be
destroyed and rebuilt.
The court rejected Farm Bureau's contention that the fire and damage from burning chemicals was not covered by the policy.
The exclusion section within the policy did
not clearly exclude contamination resulting
from a covered event. The court elaborated
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on four types of contamination: (1)gradual
contamination from natural sources; (2) contamination from external events not occurring on the insured's property; (3)contamination from an uncovered event on the
insured's property; and (4) contamination
directly resulting from a covered event occurring on the insured's premises. The court
reasoned that smoke damage to unburned
parts of the house falls within the fourth
category, and that such type four contamination is not excluded under the policy.
The court then applied a reasonableness standard to the terms of the policy. The
court analogized to a situation where heat
from a fire in a house caused bulging and
cracking to the floor. A reasonable person
would not think the bulging to the floor as
separate from the fire; it is reasonable to
think the whole event is covered. However,
ifthe bulging or cracking occurred as a result
of natural settling, the terms of the policy
exclude coverage. In the present case, the
smoke that caused the damage was laden
with toxic chemicals which, according to the
jury, rendered the house uninhabitable. As
a matter of law, theword "contamination" as
it appeared in the exclusion section of the
policy did not exclude such damage.
- by Jason Johnsoh

Green Hills Solid Waste Management
Auth. v. Madison Township Planning
and Zoning Comm'n, No. WD 47510,

1994 WL 16538 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
1994)
Thirteen municipalities created Green
Hills Solid Waste Management Authority
(Green Hills) pursuant to Chapter 70 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes for the purpose of
procuring land to use as a nonhazardous
solid waste landfill. InAugust 1989, Green
Hills purchased land at a site in rural unincorporated Mercer County. Since the land was
within Madison Township, Green Hills submitted its proposal for a landfill at the Mercer
County site to the Madison Township Planning and Zoning Commission (Commission)
on May 3, 1991, as required by Mo. REv.

§ 65.665 and the Township Zoning
Regulations. Green Hills also applied for a
special use permit to operate the landfill at
that time. The Commission denied Green
Hills' application on July 25, 1991. Green
Hills filed a request for rehearing and a notice
of appeal, but later withdrew them. Subsequently, Green Hills' Board of Directors
voted to overrule the Commission's denial,
and the Board informed the Commission of
its decision. On August 27, 1991 Green
Hills applied to the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources' (DNR) Solid Waste Management Program for an operating permit
pursuant to
Mo. REv.
STAT.
§§ 260.200-260.345. DNR returned the
application because it lacked evidence that
Green Hills had complied with local zoning
requirements.
Green Hills filed adeclaratory judgment
action with the circuit court, seeking a ruling
that it had satisfied the requirements for
overruling the Commission's denial of its
landfill proposal stated in § 65.665. The
Commission's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction was sustained by the trial court,
and Green Hills appealed to the Missouri
Court of Appeals, Western District.
The Court of Appeals characterized the
solequestion presented forappeal aswhether
the trial court erred in granting the
Commission's motion to dismiss on the basis
that Green Hills failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Commission argued
that Green Hills failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in that it did not appeal to
the Madison Township Board of Zoning
Adjustment (BZA) as required by Mo. REv.
STAT. § 65.690. However, the Court of
Appeals held that the various subsections of
§65.690 were not applicable. Furthermore,
the court noted that the action before it was
a petition for declaratory judgment, not an
appeal of the Commission's decision, and
thus it ruled that Green Hills was not required
to appeal to the BZA in order to exhaust its
administrative remedies.
The Commission also contended that
Green Hills failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in that it did not appeal the
STAT.

DNR's denial of its state permit, as required
by Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.235. The court
looked to its prior decision in City of St.
Peters v. Dep't of NaturalResources,797

S.W.2d 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), where it
held that the return of an application as
incomplete was a "decision of the agency"
which warranted administrative review under Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.235. However,
identification of the controlling law was not
sufficient for the Court of Appeals to decide
the case before it. The court indicated that
insufficient evidence prevented it from making a determination of whether Green Hills
had complied with § 260.235 by appealing
the denial of its state permit application.
Thus, the Court of Appeals remanded the
cause to the circuit court with specific instructions contingent on the results of further
proceedings. The trial court was directed to
consider the merits of Green Hills' claim for
declaratory relief ifit found that Green Hills
had requested a hearing with DNR within
thirty days of the denial, since Green Hills
would have exhausted its administrative remedies. Conversely, the trial court was directed to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction if it found that Green Hills had not
requested a hearing within the thirty day
period, since Green Hills would not have
exhausted its administrative remedies.
- by Theodore A. Kardis

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
MDU Resources Group v. W.R. Grace
and Co., 14 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1994)
MDU Resources Group (MDU) sued
W.R. Grace and Company (Grace) two years
after learning that Grace installed fireproofing in a building owned by MDU which
contained asbestos fibers. Grace installed
the fireproofing in 1968 and at that time
knew it contained asbestos. MDU did not
know the fireproofing material contained
asbestos until it learned of a Health Department study in 1980 which concluded that
while the fireproofing posed no immediate
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health risks, it recommended that MDU
remove the asbestos before the fireproofing
disintegrated. In 1988, additional tests were
performed and showed the building asbestos-contaminated. The levelwas high enough
that MDU began cleanup immediately to
protect the health of MDU workers. MDU
brought suit in 1990 to recover cleanup
costs.
MDU alleged negligence, strict liability,
failure to warn, and breach of warranty
claims. Grace defended on the grounds that
the six-year statute of limitations defeated
MDU's claims and that MDU suffered no
harm from the asbestos. The District Court
denied MDU's claims and found for Grace.
On appeal, MDU challenged the validity of Grace's instruction conceming its statute of limitations defense. The court found
thestatute of limitations jury instruction faulty
because it did not make clear that the statute
of limitations is not tolled until an injury is
discovered, as required by North Dakota law.
The court ruled that MDU could prove injury
by showing the building was contaminated
with asbestos and did not have to prove an
economic loss, and further explained that
the injury suffered isthe contamination of the
building by asbestos and not the presence of
asbestos. The court ruled that MDU's discovery of the presence of asbestos in 1980
did not constitute a reasonable awareness of
contamination.
MDU also alleged that the District Court
improperly excluded evidence offered to
prove that Grace knew that asbestos posed
health risks and that Grace knew there was
an altemative fireproofing method. The
court said the availability of altematives was
relevant and the District Court erred in refusing this evidence. In addition, MDU presented a document at trial from Grace's
insurer that discussed asbestos health hazards. The District Court refused to admit the
document on the grounds that there was no
proof Grace received the document before it
installed the fireproofing. The Court of
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Appeals called this error, saying that MDU
offered proof of Grace's receipt of the document and that the District Court had thereby
invaded the province of the jury to evaluate
the evidence. Because of these errors, the
Court reversed and remanded.
- by Don Willoh

Dravo Corp. v. Zuber, 13 F.3d 1222(8th

Cir. 1994)
Dravo Corporation (Dravo), a
nonsettling potentially responsible party
(PRP), filed suit seeking contribution under
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCIA)
from settling parties for the EPA's imposition of cleanup costs. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that
ademinimis agreement settling future claims
protects settling parties from contribution
actions, and that a nonsettling party could
not invoke judicial power to invalidate the
agreement on the ground that settling parties
were ineligible to enter into a de minimis
settlement agreement.
Dravo owned and operated a manufacturing plant in Hastings, Nebraska from
1968 through 1983, when it sold it. After
testing confirmed Drairo's responsibility for
contaminatingwellwaterapproximatelyonehalf mile away, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) filed a Unilateral Administrative Order in 1990 directing Dravo to
decontaminate the subsite. In 1991, the
EPA and adjoining property owners entered
into settlement agreements containing specific language precluding additional liability
under CERCLA §12 2(g)(5), 42 U.S.C.
§96 2 2(g)(5), and §107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§9607(a).
Dravo filedsuitaftertheproposed agreement was made but before it was entered
into, seeking a declaration that the defendants were legally responsible and liable for
a portion of the contamination and remedial

costs. The district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment, and
Dravo appealed. Dravo's two claims on
appeal are that the district court erred (1)by
entering summary judgment because material facts were in dispute, and (2) by denying
Dravo an opportunity to conduct discovery
prior to ruling on the summary judgment
motion.
With respect to the first claim, Dravo
argued that the defendants are not protected
from contribution claims until after they fulfill
the obligations under the agreement. The
Eghth Circuitrecognized thatwheneverpracticable and in the public interest, settlement
shall be entered into as promptly as possible
for either de minimis generators under 42
U.S.C. §9622(g)(1)(A), orde minimis owners
under 42 U.S.C. §9622(g)(1)(B). Because
section 9622 permits, and in fact encourages, the expeditious resolution of claims
against PRP's who are determined to be de
minimis, the court held that defendants are
immediatelyvestedwiththeprotectionagainst
contribution claims upon entering into a de
minimis agreement, which is then subject to
laterdivestmentif they fail to "carryout" their
part of the agreement. The court, therefore,
concluded that no issue of material fact
existed, and affirmed the summary judgment.
Dravo's second claim was that the district courterred byfailingtotimelyruleon the
defendants motion to stay discovery, which
effectively denied Dravo the right to discover
information relevantto two issues: (1)whether
defendants in fact contributed to the contamination, which may prevent qualification
for a de minimis.settlement, and (2)whether
defendants completely performed their obligations under the agreement.
Facts relating to the defendants' eligibility for a de minimis agreement would only be
relevant ifa nonsettling party were entitled to
challenge the validity of a de minimis agreement. The Eighth Circuit stated that in light
of the explicit language of §9622(a) (which
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specifically precludes judicial review), the
structure of §9622 (which generously gives
the President discretion to use settlement
mechanisms), and the objectiveof CERCLA's
settlement provisions (which is to allow expedient and efficient settlements of potential
liability), a nonsettling party may not invoke
the judicial power to invalidate a de minimis
agreement embodied in an administrative
order on eligibility grounds.
The court noted that parties such as
Dravo are not completely without recourse.
Nonsettling parties may participate in the
formation of administrativedeminimis agreements by filing objections during a noticeand-comment period, which Dravo did.
These proceedings are nonsettling parties'
sole opportunity to block de minimis agreements.
Dravo additionally sought to discover
whether the defendants performed their
obligations under the de minimis agreement.
The court, however, stated thatonly theEPA
may rescind de minimls agreements, and
thus any information Dravo seeks regarding
Zuber's performance of its obligations was
irrelevant.
- by Mark Meyer

Kane v. United States, 15 F.3d 87 (8th
Cir. 1994)
Bradley and Cynthia Kane brought an
action against the United States to recover
damages when they discovered asbestos in
their house they purchased from the Veterans Administration (VA). The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals denied petitioners' claims,
holding that the discretionary function exception to waiver of sovereign immunity
shielded the United States from liability for
the VA's failure to inspect for asbestos, and
in addition that the house is excepted under
CERCLA as a consumer product in consumer use.
The Kanes purchased the residence in
June 1989 pursuant to a VA newspaper

advertisement selling the foreclosed property in "as is" condition. Relying on the
inspections oftwoappraisers from theKanes'
lender, as well as on the sales broker, the
Kanes purchased the residence. In January
1990, hazardous asbestos was discovered in
their house, and the Kane's subsequently
pursued an effort to recover damages under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U.S.C. §§ 2674,2680(a), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and LiabilityAct(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657.
Under the former claim, the FTCA
provides that sovereign immunity is waived
for tort claims relating to acts or omissions of
government employees while exercising due
care in executing a statute or regulation, or
while performing a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency. Here,
there is no statute or regulation prescribing a
duty for agency employees to include asbestos supervision or inspection in their judgments. Inaddition, the actions and decisions
must be based on public policy considerations. The court concluded that under the
housing loan program, the VA's policy is to
sell acquired property quickly and at the best
price, with no requirements relating toasbestos removal. Thus, the court affirmed that
district courts dismissal of the FTCA claim.
The Kanes additionally sought damages under CERCLA, which confers liability
upon owners or operators of the facility
where the hazardous disposal occurred, or
upon those who arranged for disposal or
treatment of hazardous substances-at a facility. The definition of facility specifically
excludes "any consumer product in consumer use." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). The
Eighth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning of Dayton Independent School
v. United States Mineral Products Co.,
906 F.2d 1059,1065 &n.4(5thCir. 1990),
which stated that Congress intended to provide recovery from inactive and abandoned
waste releases, not from consumer products
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in use. The Kane court therefore concluded
that the VA's holding the property for sale
did not change the consumer product in
consumer use to another character, affirming the district court which dismissed the
CERCLA claim.
- by Mark Meyer

HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
Westing v. County of Mille Lacs, 512
N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 1994)
The Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (MPCA) conducted a Phase I Environmental Survey of an 8.06 acre parcel
leased to the Westling Manufacturing Company (WMC) by the company president,
John Westling. The MPCA found the property was contaminated by tetrachloroethylene, an auto part degreaser. In 1990, the
MPCA placed the property on the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Information System
(CERCUS) and state Superfund lists. The
MPCA named Westling as a responsible
party because he owned the property and
because he knew WMC used hazardous
substances on the site.
In a subsequent property tax valuation
proceeding of the contaminated property
andacontiguouspropertyownedby Westling
and his wife, the Westlings presented testimony that they or WMC spent approximately $250,000 from 1989 to August of
1992 to investigate and monitor hazardous
substances on the property. An employee of
the company hired by Westling to do the
investigating and monitoring testified that
Westling's costs to continue the investigation
and cleanup would amount to $60,000 for
each of the next ten years. Finally, the
Westlings produced an expert witness who
testified that polluted properties were difficult to sell and that commercial real estate
values in the area were generally depressed,
making the Westlings property essentially
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worthless for tax valuation purposes.
The County of Mille Lacs' case consisted primarily of the expert testimony of a
licensed real estate appraiser. This witness
conducted an appraisal of the property,
using three different accounting methods, on
request by the County. The witness testified
that the property was worth $880,000 using
the best method, income capitalization, after
discounting the present value of the monitoring and cleanup costs.
The tax court found the property unmarketable because of the costs and unknown extent of the contamination, and
subsequently placed the property's value at
$100. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the tax court decision
as dearly erroneous because it was not
reasonably supported by the weight of the
evidence. The Court said the tax court must
regard a licensed assessor's valuation as
prima facie valid, shifting the burden of proof ,to the other party to show the assessor'sC
valuation as inaccurate. Ifthe tax court is to
rule against the assessor's valuation, it must
identify and analyze the mistakes in the
assessor's methods. The Supreme Court
reversed the Tax Court's finding because it
failed to analyze the assessor's methods in its
opinion. TheSupreme Court also found that
the tax court ignored evidence that the
Westlings knew the land was contaminated
when they purchased it, that banks continued to make loans based on the property's
value, and that the Westlings made no effort
to sell the property.
- by Don Willoh

Independent Petrochemical Corp., et
al., v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,
et al., 842 F.Supp. 575 (D.D.C. 1994)
Independent Petrochemical Corporation (IPC) paid Russell Bliss to removedioxin
waste materials from one of IPC's customers, NortheastemPharmaceutical and Chemical Company (NEPACCO). Bliss did so, later
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mixing it with waste oil and spraying the
mixture as a dust suppressant at several
Missouri locations. Over 57 civil actions
were filed against IPC and others, alleging
bodily injury and property damage resulting
from exposure to dioxin contamination. As
IPC had 23 insurers, IPC agreed to help
NEPACCO dispose of the waste material
between 1971 and 1983. In1983, IPC filed
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that
IPC's insurers were obligated to defend and
indemnify plaintiffs for all settlements and
judgments in the dioxin-related claims arising out of the spraying of the hazardous
waste material.
The insurance policies generally excluded compensation for personal or property injury arising out of discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of toxic chemicals, waste
materials or other contaminants. However,
the insurers would pay if the discharge,
dispersal, release or escape was "sudden" or
"accidental." On defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the District Court held
that the contaminations were not sudden or
accidental, and therefore were not covered
by the policies.
The court stated that although Missouri
had not answered the question as to this
pollution exclusion clause, the Eighth Circuit
interpreted Missouri law regarding the "sudden and accidental" language and found the
phrase unambiguous and synonymous with
"abrupt" and "unexpected." Finding that
IPC's claim was without merit, the court first
rejected IPC's argument that the term "sudden" in the pollution exclusion clause was a
redundant term that should not be given
meaning, stating that Missouri recognizes an
"anti-redundancy rule" and gives meaning to
all terms of an insurance contract. Next, the
court held that the sprayings were not sudden because IPC failed to show that the Bliss
sprayings were isolated, discrete events.
Because the sprayings were performed as
part of Bliss' regular course of business for
over two years, they did not meet this court's
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test. Finally, the court found that the incident
was not accidental. IPC argued that the
sprayings were accidental because Bliss did
not know of the contaminating effects of the
discharge. The court decided these facts
were irrelevant to its determination of IPC's
liability. The pollution exclusion clauses did
not ask ifthe damage inflicted was intended.
It was enough that Bliss knew he was discharging the waste material itself. The Court
cited New York case law for its conclusion
that IPC was responsible even though the
cause of the contamination was Bliss but did
not discuss the reasoning behind the New
York authorities.
- by Don Willoh

3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C.
Cir. 1994)
The 3M Company (3M) unknowingly
committed several violations of the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2629 between August 1980 and
July 1986. In 1986, 3M notified the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that one
of its chemicals, which it believed to be from
a domestic manufacturer, had in fact originated in Canada and did not appear on the
EPA inventory of existing chemicals. This
was a clear violation of TSCA which requires
that prior to the importation of a new chemical the importer give a Premanufacture Notice to EPA. In a further review of its
inventory of chemicals, 3M noticed that a
second chemical imported numerous times
between July 15, 1983 and August 4, 1986
was mistakenly classified as non-new and
that no Premanufacture Notice had been
filed. 3M notifiedthe EPA of this violation on
September 16, 1986.
On September 2, 1988, the EPA filed
an administrative complaint against 3M pursuant to § 16(a)(2)(A) of TSCA for not filing
Premanufacture Notices and for 3M's use of
inaccurate Customs certifications with respect to the two chemicals. The complaiht

Case Summaries
sought $1.3 million in civil penalties. In
answer to the complaint, 3M alleged that the
statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462,
generally applicable to civil fines and penalties, barred the EPA's complaint
Since TSCA itself fails to provide for a
time limit within which TSCA actions must
be brought, the EPA administrative lawjudge
(ALJ) reasoned that no statute of limitations
applied to § 16(a)(2)(A) proceedings because
28 U.S.C. § 2462 applied only to judicial
proceedings. The A. based his decision on
the predecessor of § 2462 which barred a
"suit or prosecution" after the statutory period claiming that the later substitution of
"action, suit or proceeding" for "suit or
prosecution" effected no substantive change,
and that an agency adjudication did not
constitute a prosecution. The AU imposed
a $130,650 penalty on 3M. 3M filed petition for review in the D.C. Court of Appeals
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(3).
The Court of Appeals rejected theALJ's
construction of § 2462. The court held that
§ 2462 prohibited all actions, suits or proceedings from being brought after the fiveyear limitation period had expired. The
court stated that an administrative adjudication fit easily within this description citing the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
554(b), which TSCA explicitly incorporates
and which denominates agency adjudications as "proceedings." Further, the court
ruled that agency adjudications were analogous to prosecutions because of their typically "accusatory flavor."
For the § 2462 statutory period to bar
an action, the "action, suit or proceeding"
must be "for the enforcement of any civil
fine, penalty, or forfeiture." The EPA asserted that the term enforcement connoted
an action to collect an already existing penalty whereas a § 16(a)(2) proceeding merely
imposes a penalty. 3M argued that "enforce" was the semantic equivalent of "impose" and that a contrary ruling would render § 2462 inapplicable to TSCA actions.

The court primarily relied on the history of
§ 2462 in rejecting EPA's statutory interpretation. The predecessor to § 2462 did not
use the word "enforcement" The revisers
noted that the addition of "enforcement"
was a change in phraseology only. Accordingly, the court utilized traditional canons of
construction to interpret the revised statute
as substantively identical to the pre-revision
statute. The court held that the pre-1948
statute was not solely applicable to actions
seeking to collect already imposed penalties.
Therefore, assessment proceedings under
TSCA are proceedings for enforcement of
penalties thus subjecting such actions to the
time limitations of § 2462.
Because § 2462 bars actions, suits or
proceedings thatare not "commenced within
five years from the date when the claim first
accrued," determination of when the claim
"first accrued" isimportant. The EPA, in an
attempt to equate its situation with that of
plaintiffs in personal injury actions suffering
from latent injuries, contended that the claim
first accrued upon discovery of the violation.
The court held that because the imposition
of a civil penalty under TSCA was punishment and not remedial, the claim accrued on
the date of violation, not when EPA discovered the violation. Additionally, the court
refused to consider special enforcement difficulties encountered by EPA stating that
§ 2462 applies to all civil penalty cases
instigated by the federal government and not
just to EPA enforcement of TSCA. The EPA
could not initiate a proceeding under TSCA
against 3M for violations that allegedly predate the five-year window imposed by
§ 2462.
- by Thad Mulholland

AIR
Monsanto Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 19 F.3d 1201 (7th Cir.

1994)
Monsanto filed a petition to review an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decision denying Monsanto's request for additional time to comply with certain hazardous
air emissions standards under the Clean Air
Act (CAA). The specific emission limit in
question was for benzene pursuant to 40
C.F.R. § 61.271 (1990). The standard
became effective fornew or modified sources
on September 14,1989, but did not apply to
existing sources until ninety days after the
effective date. Monsanto fit into the latter
category. The CAA also gave the EPA
Administrator authority to grant a waiver to
existing sources for up to two years ifsuch an
extension is necessary. Monsanto was not
prepared to comply with the new benzene
standard in December of 1989 and requested
a waiver until August 15, 1990, to allow the
company to install water scrubbing equipment designed to satisfy the standard. The
EPA granted the request. After installation,
however, Monsanto discovered that the
equipment did not perform as anticipated
and asked the EPA for another extension to
install additional equipment. This time the
EPA denied the request which lead to the
instant case.
The issue was whether the Administrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding that two years was not necessary for
Monsanto to comply with the benzene standard. The EPA asserted that Monsanto's
request did not provide sufficient information to show that an additional waiver of
compliance was necessary. Although the
court found manyoftheconcemstobevalid,
it also recognized that Monsanto submitted a
thorough response to each of the concerns.
The company explained that its original
scrubber technology was designed to recap-
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ture and reuse benzene, when in reality
carbon absorption resulted which created a
hazardous waste that would require special
treatment or disposal.
Monsanto makes no claim that it could
not have installed carbon absorption system
under its initial waiver, but asserts that disposing of waste generated by such technology involved considerable expense and environmental concern. The court found that
the EPA's explanation that the company was
experimenting with various technology
grossly mischaracterized Monsanto's approach. Rather, the court found that
Monsanto had made a scientifically and environmentally sound decision to proceed
with its initial scrubber system, and had every
reason to believe it would perform as expected. The EPA also ignored the fact that
the initial scrubber system chosen by
Monsanto complied with EPA's own pollution prevention policy. The EPA appeared
to say that ifa "quick fix" solution is available,
pollution sources are required to employ the
"quick fix" without regard to adverse environmental ramifications. The court found
this view short-sighted and bad environmental policy. The court also found that other
reasons given by the EPA for the denial had
no foundation in the record. Thus the court
found that the EPA acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in denying Monsanto's request.
- by Jason Johnson

United States v. B & W Inv. Proper-

ties, Inc., No. 91 C 5886, 1994 WL
53781 (N.D.ll. Feb. 18, 1994)
The United States obtained a summary
judgment against Defendants Louis Wolf
(Wolf) and B &WInvestment Properties, Inc.
(B& V) on the issue of liability for asbestos
contamination of their property in violation
oftheQeanAirAct452 U.S.C. §§7412and
7414. The court subsequently referred the
case to a magistrate judge to assess the
amount of fine to be imposed.
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Themagistrate recommended themaximum fine of $25,000 per day for the period
of October 15, 1990 through January 21,
1990 for the defendants failure to keep
friable asbestos materials wetted pursuant to
C.F.R. § 61.147(c). The total fine equalled
$1,675,000, for which the defendants were
to be jointly and severally liable. However,
the magistrate noted that because Wolfs
personal net worth was only $2,000,000,
his individual liability was limited to
$1,500,000. Additionally, the magistrate
imposed no separate fine for the defendants
failure to notify the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) because the fine already
imposed would deplete 75%of Wolf's assets.
On hearingby the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the
Government argued that the court should
adopt themagistrate's recommendations but
contested the magistrate's findings conceming the commencement date of the fine and
Wolfs net worth. Wolf and B & W objected
to the magistrate's recommendation that the
maximum daily fine be imposed and to her
computation of the number of days used to
calculate the fines.
The applicable standard of review of a
magistrate judge's recommendations, as set
forth by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), is de novo
where a dispositive motion has been made.
Thus, where a party has made an objection,
the district court judge must makea de novo
determination as to those specific portions of
the magistrate's recommendations to which
the party objects.
The court began its discussion by finding that Wolf had culpable knowledge of the
asbestos violations nolaterthan October l5,
1990. This finding precipitateda determination of what time the fines accrued from. The
court concurred with the magistrate's recommendation that the fines begin 30' days
after Wolf learned of the problem because of
the permissive nature of § 7413(eX2) and
becauseitfoundthat30 days was a "reasonable length of time" to initiate remediation.
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The court also adopted that magistrate's
recommendations that the daily fines end
upon the commencement of clean-up work
despite language in the Clean Air Act (Act)
which provides for penalties to continue until
the violator proves continual compliance
with the Act. Again, the court cited the
permissiveness of § 7413(e)(2) to make its
holding.
In setting the daily amount of the fine,
the court considered a number of factors
mandated by statute. First, it noted that
because theAct and the accompanying regulations were amended in November 1990,
the courtheld thatpre-amendmentlawshould
apply because the acts predated the amendment. The pre-amendment law, set forth in
42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988), requires that in
setting the amount of the penalty courts
consider the size of the business, the economic impact of the penalty on the business,
and the seriousness of the violation as wellas
"other factors". The court apparently considered the factors listed by the amendment,
§ 7413(e), as the "other factors" contemplated by the pre-amendment law. The
§ 7413(e) criteria which do not overlap with
the pre-amendment lawinclude theduration
of theviolation and the violator's compliance
history and good faith efforts to comply.
The court recognized that though adjusting the violator's fine based on the duration of the violation may be perceived as
rewarding long-term violators, it should nevertheless be a factor in setting the daily fine.
However, the court noted, the daily finemust
be high enough to be an effective deterrent
to clea rpeaybyviolators. Thecourtalso
considered that Wf didl not previously violate the Act. The courtf held that a dean
record would not decrease the fine but that
previous violations would increaser the fine
In evaluating the seriousness of the
violation, the court held that all asbestos
violations are serious. It further noted as
exacerbating factors the defendants' failure
to warn those coming into contact with the
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premises, and an EPA inspector's declaration that the violations were the most serious
ones he had encountered. These circumstances warranted a daily fine at or near the
maximum.
The court held that Wolf's ability to pay,
as evidenced by the magistrate's finding that
he had a $2,000,000 net worth, had not
been properly challenged bythegovemment
because it failed to introduce competent
evidence indicating a higherrnetworth. Thus,
the magistrate's recommendation that Wolfs
fine be limited to $1,500,000 was appropriate.
The court held that because theamount
of the fine for the wetting violation was
substantial, no separate fine for failure to
give notice under 40 C.F.R. § 61.146 was
necessary. Finally, the court held the defendants jointly and severally liable for the penalties as "owners" and "operators" under 42
U.S.C. § 7413(b).
- by Thad Mulholland

ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, et al., v.
Babbitt, et al., 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir.

1994)
A group comprised of non-profit organizations and other associations (Sweet
Home) brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior challenging the validity of
certain regulations promulgated by the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) under the direction of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
At issue was the interpretation and scope of
the terms "harm" and "take" under the ESA.
The ESA prohibits any person from taking
any fish or animal listed as an endangered
species, and further defines "take" to include
harming or attempting to harm an endangered species. In addition, the FWS has
defined the term "harm" to encompass any
significant habitat modification as a type of

harm that would result in a prohibited taking
of an endangered species. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
Sweet Home argued that the FWS's definition of harm was in violation of the ESA
because there was no showing that Congress
intended to include habitat modification within
the context of the taking of an endangered
species. The court agreed with Sweet Home
and found that the FWS's definition of harm
was not authorized by Congress and was not
a reasonable interpretation of the ESA.
In reaching this conclusion the court
first looked to the other terms in the ESA's
definition of "take," which include "harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect," and found that all of
them contemplate a direct and physical injury to an identifiable member of an endangered species as opposed to mere habitat
modification. Inutilizing themaximnoscitur
a socils, which means that a word is defined
by the surrounding terms, the court acknowledged that this maxim is useful to define
words that are capable of more than one
meaning to preventan "unintended breadth"
to an act of Congress.
The court next addressed the structure
and history of the ESA to support its determination that "take"should not include habitat modification. In 1973, a bill was intr6duced before the Senate Commerce Committee and the Subcommittee on Environment that specifically included habitat modification within the definition of "take." As
this bill was ultimately rejected, the court
offered this as proof that the intentional
deletion of habitat modification from the
definition of take bolstered its conclusion.
In addition, the court looked to the
1982 ESA amendments as a basis for its
finding. First, the government argued that
the amendment which allows the FWS to
issue permits for "incidental" takings implies
that habitat modification is a reasonable
interpretation of harm. The court rejected
this theory and stated that the other terms
included in the ESA's definition of take
contemplate such incidental takings without

the inclusion of habitat modification. Instead, the court found that the addition of the
FWS's ability to issue permits for incidental
takings reflected the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) viewpoint that there is
no intent requirement for taking an endangered species, and also that any taking will
result in violation of the ESA no matter how
slight. Therefore, the permit plan amendment did not support any assumptions to
justify the FWS's inclusion of habitat modification.
Second, the govemment argued that
the mere process of amending the ESA,
including conference reports mentioning
habitat conservation, notice of the habitat
modification regulation, and the withdrawal
of an amendment to include habitat modification, ratified the FWS's interpretation.
Again, the court rejected this theory. The
court first stated that although the conference report addressing the ESA amendment
used the term habitat conservation, this could
not be interpreted to allow the FWS to
assume that habitat modification should be
included in the definition of harm. Next, the
government argued that because a House
subcommittee had notice of the FWS regulationanda9thCircuitcasewhichupheldsuch
an interpretation, there was an implied ratification of the regulation. The court dismissed this argumentbecauseultimatelythere
was no proof that either Housewas aware of
either the regulation or the case. Finally, the
court addressed the relation between a
senator's decision to withdraw an amendment to change the definition of "take" and
the congressional opinion on how this term
should be defined. The court stated that this
withdrawal was not an indication as to the
extent of congressional focus on the issue
and did not in any way reflect how Congress
viewed the matter. In addition, the court
identified the pattern of precedents that
generally refuse to infer ratification of a
regulation from amendments to related
clauses. Therefore, the court held that the
FWS regulation was invalid in light of the
ESA's definition of "take."
- by V. Alyse Hakami

ML119

